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Sound Recording Devices Used as Evidence*
Peter P. Roper**
N 1906, SOME THREE DECADES after inventor Thomas Alva Edison
sketched out on paper his "talking machine," an enterprising
plaintiff, disturbed by the clatter of trains going by his residence,
went to court with sound recordings of the noise and, offering
them in evidence, won his case against the railroad.1
While early defendants clearly did not like to confront this
sort of evidence, particularly in the absence of case law on the
subject, few could match the outrage of the famous Clarence
Darrow as he defended himself from a charge of bribery based
upon dictograph recordings presented in evidence against him.
To Darrow, use of the machine was a monstrous invasion of
privacy, and the secret methods used to make the recordings,
bellowed Darrow, were without parallel in the annals of crimi-
nal trials.2
Since Edison's first model, recording devices have made
amazing progress. Instead of recording on Edison's original tin-
foil cylinders, modern recorders make their impression-either
magnetic or mechanical-on magnetized wire or tape, plastic
belts, or discs.
Some recorders are small enough to be tucked under the
armpit. Others can be concealed under a belt3 or in a brief case,
while the miniature microphone can be hidden in a shirt pocket,
behind a necktie, or disguised as a wristwatch or boutonniere. It
is fully within reason to anticipate a future model on the order
of spectacles with built-in hearing aids.
Recordings have been offered in evidence in a wide variety
of cases, including an attempted bribery of a draft board official, 4
* Subjects such as wire-tapping, use of silent or sound-track motion pic-
tures, and the recording of court proceedings, while related in varying de-
grees to the principles of operation and use of sound recording devices
were felt to be beyond the scope of this article.
* B.A., M.A., Western Reserve University; Teaching Fellow in American
History, Cleveland College of Western Reserve University; Publicity and
Promotion Manager, Radio Station WERE; a Senior at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.
1 Boyne City, G. & A. R. Co. v. Anderson, 146 Mich. 328, 108 N. W. 429
(1906).
2 Weinberg, Attorney for the Damned 516 (1957).
3 State v. Lyskoski, 47 Wash. 2d 102, 287 P. 2d 114 (1955).
4 United States v. Schanerman, C. A. 3 N. J., 150 F. 2d 941 (1945).
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treasonous radio broadcasts,5 conspiracy to obstruct justice in a
federal narcotics case, 6 illegal short-wave radio transmissions aid-
ing the illegal entry of Mexican nationals, 7 disturbance to a motel
by barking dogs in an adjoining pet hospital,8 and noises made
by trains,9 planes, 10 and a cement factory."
Use by attorneys is virtually limitless, including the record-
ing of discussions with clients, of library research, of depositions,
and of wills. 12
The present status of reported case law in this field, while
dating back as far as 1906,13 is of relatively recent development.
Slightly more than half the states report any cases at all, with
the preponderance being decided in California, New York, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, Connecticut, and Min-
nesota.14
The admissibility of sound recordings as evidence in court
was aided largely by the rules of evidence governing telephone
conversations. One court in 1906 said:
Communications conducted through the medium of the
telephone are held to be admissible, at least in cases where
there is testimony that the voice was recognized . . . The
ground for receiving the testimony of the phonograph would
seem stronger, since in its case there is not only proof by
the human witness of the making of the sounds to be re-
produced, but a reproduction by the mechanical witness of
the sounds themselves. 15
Professor John Henry Wigmore, in his highly esteemed work
on Evidence said "the phonograph and the 'dictagraph' fall under
the principle of the telephone." 16
5 Gillars v. United States, 87 App. D. C. 16, 182 F. 2d 962 (1950).
6 Zamlock v. United States, C. A. 9 Cal., 193 F. 2d 889 (1952).
7 United States v. Sugden, C. A. 9 Ariz., 226 F. 2d 281 (1955).
s Wilms v. Hand, 101 Cal. App. 2d 811, 226 P. 2d 728 (1951).
9 Boyne City G. & A. R. Co. v. Anderson, supra note 1.
10 Andresen v. Clear Ridge Aviation, Inc., 9 F. R. D. 50 (D. C. Neb. 1949).
11 Frank v. Cossitt Cement Products, 197 Misc. 670, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 337 (1950).
12 Rippner, Drafting of the "Simple" Will, 8 Clev-Mar. L. R. 320.
13 Boyne City G. & A. R. Co. v. Anderson, supra note 1.
14 58 A. L. R. 2d 1026 (1958).
15 Boyne City G. & A. R. Co. v. Anderson, supra note 1.
16 Wigmore, Evidence 195 (3rd Ed. 1940).
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SOUND RECORDING EVIDENCE
A more direct comparison can be made to the admissibility
of photographs. As recently as 1955, another court said that a
"dubbed" or re-recorded tape bore the same relationship to the
original recording that a photograph bears to a negative.17 The
similarity warrants further comparison. Discussing the objection
that a photograph may be made to misrepresent the object, Wig-
more scoffed that the argument "is of no validity," adding,
It is true that a photograph can be deliberately so taken
as to convey the most false impression of the object. But
so also can any witness lie in his words. A photograph can
falsify just as much and no more than the human being who
takes it or verifies it. The fallacy of the objection occurs in
assuming that the photograph can come in testimonially with-
out a competent person's oath to support it.i
It soon became apparent to most courts that a sound record-
ing possessed attributes unknown to other forms of evidence,
such as the ability to capture the shades of meaning that come
with inflection, emphasis and other qualities of speech.19 As a
result, many courts today feel that sound recordings may be
more accurate and of more help to the court than the testimony
of a human witness,20 although, as we shall see later, this ac-
ceptance is not universal.
Nevertheless, virtually all courts which have considered
sound recordings offered in evidence have accepted them with
relatively minor reservations. The main problem has been to
apply adequate safeguards to assure authentic recordings of past
events without requiring an "excessive burden of preliminary
proof to establish their admissibility." Said the court in State v.
Williams,21 "Too stringent requirements could effectively limit
the use of a valuable addition to the evidentiary mediums now
available to the trial court." But, the court cautiously added,
"Too little restriction could result in ingenious fraud and tamper-
ing." This last remark would be of no surprise to radio station
engineers who are able to edit out coughs, sneezes, and even
stutters from a person's tape recorded speech, or completely
juxtapose words, sentences, and paragraphs without detection
by even an alert listener.
17 State v. Lyskoski, supra note 3.
18 Wigmore, supra note 16 at 185.
19 State v. Reyes, 209 Or. 607, 308 P. 2d 182 (1957).
20 United States v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 973 (D. C. Dist. Col. 1950).
21 49 Wash. 2d 354, 301 P. 2d 769 (1956).
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From the beginning, the courts have applied the same ex-
clusionary rules of evidence to second recordings as they have
to other kinds of evidence. But while the principle of laying the
foundation for admission of evidence has not changed, the pe-
culiarities of sound recordings have caused the courts to estab-
lish certain requirements for the admission of sound recording
devices in evidence.
Synthesizing the courts' experience in the newly developed
and rapidly expanding field, a Georgia court22 in 1955 laid down
this set of rules which has been liberally quoted in cases since
then:
1. It must be shown that the mechanical transcription de-
vice was capable of taking testimony.
2. It must be shown that the operator of the device was com-
petent to operate the device.
3. The authenticity and correctness of the recording must
be established.
4. It must be shown that changes, additions, or deletions
have not been made.
5. The manner of preservation of the record must be shown.
6. Speakers must be identified.
7. It must be shown that the testimony elicited was freely
and voluntarily made, without any kind of duress.
Authorities, along with general case law, support the validity
of the outline, which is here adopted for a more comprehensive
examination.
I. Device must be capable of recording testimony
Determination of the mechanical efficiency and ability of the
sound recording device most often hinges upon the discretion of
the trial judge himself after evaluating the testimony of a com-
petent witness as to the operation of the device. 23 The courts
seem not to be concerned with the type of recording device that
is used, so long as it is capable of authentic transcription of
sound.2 4 Points I and II of this outline are usually dealt with at
the same time by the courts.
22 Steve M. Solomon, Jr. Inc. v. Edgar, 92 Ga. App. 207, 88 So. 2d 167 (1955).
23 Monroe v. United States, 98 App. D. C. 228, 234 F. 2d 54 (1956).
24 Ray v. State, 213 Miss. 650, 57 So. 2d 469 (1952).
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H. Competence of the operator
It seems logical that the competence of an operator of a
sound recording device depends in some measure upon his testi-
mony as to the machine's operation, and his method of operating
it,25 but apparently his product sometimes betrays him. In Hunt-
er v. Hunter,26 where a recording containing evident deletions,
blurrings, and lack of continuity was offered in evidence, the
court ruled the recordings inadmissible because of the inexpert-
ness and incompetence of the operator of the device, rather than
attributing the recording's poor quality to intentional manipula-
tion.
IH. Establishing the recording's authenticity
The authenticity of recordings is usually attacked on the
grounds that the evidence submitted is a re-recording, or because
it is inaudible, incomplete, or unintelligible.
Re-recordings are submitted usually because the original re-
cording was made on a device on which the recording could be
heard only with the aid of earphones, and the recording was
dubbed by a standard reproduction process to a tape which could
be played audibly without recourse to earphones. 27
However, it is recommended that the original recording be
submitted as well, to validate the re-recording, 28 otherwise the
re-recording might be excluded as secondary evidence. 29 It is
particularly important to remember this when the re-recordings
are being dubbed by a professional recording firm which makes
a practice of erasing tapes once the sound has been transcribed
onto other tapes or discs.
Where an original tape is destroyed, the re-recording may
be admitted if its authenticity is corroborated by the accused in
his testimony; 30 and where the original is too fragile to be used,
an affidavit may be filed as to this fact. 31
Ordinarily, an entire recording will not be ruled inadmissible
merely because some portion is inaudible or incomplete, on the
25 Monroe v. United States, supra note 23; Ragusa v. American Metal Works,
Inc., 97 So. 2d 683 (1957).
26 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A. 2d 403 (1951).
27 State v. Lyskoski, supra note 3.
28 Ibid.; People v. Porter, 105 Cal. App. 2d 324, 233 P. 2d 102 (1951).
29 People v. King, 101 Cal. App. 2d 500, 225 P. 2d 950 (1950).
30 Hurt v. State, 303 P. 2d 485 (Okla. Crim. 1956).
31 Monroe v. United States, supra note 23.
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ground that a witness may testify to only a part of a conversa-
tion if that is all he heard.3 2 In State v. Raasch,33 the court said:
The fact that there was no record made of those parts
of the telephone conversations which related to subjects
other than those of which the defendant stands here accused
did not render the relevant part of the conversations inad-
missible. The operators of these machines were informed as
to the nature of the conversation which they were asked to
record, and so when the conversation began to relate to other
subjects they did not record it. If there was further con-
versation which the defendant thought bore upon the matter,
he was, of course, perfectly at liberty to show it by the other
party to the conversation if he did not care to go upon the
stand.3 4
In a case where much of the recording was unintelligible, and
no witnesses were presented who heard the conversation as it
was being recorded, the court ruled the recordings inadmissible
in evidence on the grounds that they were subject to varying in-
terpretations by the jurors who were left to speculate as to what
testimony had been presented to them. 35
IV. Changes, additions, or deletions
Fundamentally, the party objecting to a recording on the
grounds of changes, additions, or deletions has the burden of
proof. An interesting factor here is the relative ease with which
a tape recording under certain circumstances can be edited to
say exactly the opposite of what the speaker said in the original
recording. While there might be a natural tendency to be wary
of such evidence, as Wigmore points out, photographs-and, it
follows, tape recordings--cannot be introduced without a com-
petent person's oath to support them.3 6
But, a demonstration of the ease of editing might well affect
the credibility of an expert witness in the eyes of the court and
jury. In People v. Feld,37 the appellant called a wire-tap expert
to testify whether the conditions of the recordings indicated
mutilation, or the possibility of duplicate or substitute recordings,
but his testimony proved abortive for when asked on direct
examination whether after looking at the record and examin-
32 People v. Jackson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 776, 271 P. 2d 199 (1954).
33 201 Minn. 158, 275 N. W. 620-21 (1937).
34 See Also: People v. Feld, 305 N. Y. 322, 113 N. E. 2d 440 (1953).
35 People v. Stephens, 117 Cal. App. 2d 653, 256 P. 2d 1038 (1953).
36 Wigmore, op cit., 185.
37 Supra, note 34.
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ing it, he could tell if it was a duplicate or an original, his
reply had been "No, sir, I could not" and at another point
"Could you tell from that record and having heard it played,
whether words had been inserted * * * or whether it was
the original record?" he answered "I could not tell." There-
after, on objection by the People, the witness was not al-
lowed to state why he could not tell nor was he allowed to
state his opinion as to what accounted for the pauses.
Sometimes a recording is challenged because its sound has
been amplified, and thus changed. In a 1957 case, in which the
plaintiff went to court with recordings of noises made by a neigh-
boring metal working shop, the judge accepted the testimony of
the operator and of those parties who were present when the
recordings were made, that the normal tones of the voices on the
tape speaking in explanation and narration were on a proper
level with the noises being recorded.38
V. Manner of the preservation of the record must be shown
This requirement of showing the manner of preservation of
the record is best accomplished by being able to trace, to the
satisfaction of the court, the status of the recordings from the
time they are made until they are admitted in court.39 Probably
the wisest course is to have the equipment operator hand over
the tape to the office clerk or secretary who may then keep it in a
safe place, much in the same manner that an attorney would have
his secretary handle such details in the mailing of a registered
letter, so that she can testify on the witness stand, if necessary.
VI. Identifying the speakers
It is generally held that a witness may testify as to what he
heard on a recording if he can identify the voices recorded.40 This
identification may be based upon observation or upon familiarity
with the voices' tonal qualities. It is not vital that the witness
know or see the person whose voice is being recorded before the
recording itself is made. In State v. Raasch, 41 after the witnesses
made the recordings, they saw the defendant and heard him talk
repeatedly, and were able to testify in court that the voice they
heard over the telephone at the time the recordings were made
38 Ragusa v. American Metal Works, Inc., supra note 26.
39 State v. Lyskoski, supra note 3.
40 20 Am. Jr. 249 (1939).
41 Supra, note 33.
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was the voice of the defendant. This, the court ruled, was suf-
ficient identification.
VH. Testimony must be given freely, voluntarily, without duress
Sound recorded confessions are becoming increasingly valu-
able to the courts as compared with a confession taken in short-
hand and later reduced to writing. This is especially true where a
question is being raised as to whether the confession is voluntary,
since the court can hear the actual voices of the accused and of
those doing the questioning. 42
It must be remembered that a witness whose sound recorded
voice is being offered in testimony may claim privilege against
self-incrimination, particularly in cases where the evidence was
illegally or surreptitiously obtained.4 3 Of course, a voluntary dis-
closure will not be protected by the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination, nor will a waiver of immunity signed
or stated before the sound recordings are made.44
Where a recording is made of a speech, presentation of the
sound recording as evidence is governed by the rules applying
to witnessing the speech rather than by rules applying to the
speaker whose voice was recorded. 45
However, in State v. Spencer,46 the secretly recorded state-
ment of the defendant in a murder prosecution was construed by
the court as an admission against interest, not as a confession,
and was held properly admitted despite the objection that it
constituted compulsory self-incrimination. The court said that
there was no duty on the part of the state to prove that the ad-
mission was voluntary, pointing out that the record failed to show
otherwise.
Sound recordings made while the subject was under the ef-
fects of truth serum (sodium pentothal) have been ruled inad-
missible,4T as have privileged communications as between hus-
band and wife,48 or attorney and client, unless a third party made
the voice recordings. Such rulings are made on the theory that
42 Ray v. State, supra note 24; Williams v. State, 93 Okla. Crim. 260, 226 P.
2d 989 (1951).
43 n., 58 A. L. R. 1036 (1958).
44 State v. Gensmer, 235 Minn. 72, 51 N. W. 2d 680 (1951).
45 Burgman v. United States, 88 App. D. C. 184, 188 F. 2d 637 (1951); Gil-
lars v. United States, supra note 5.
46 74 Idaho 173, 258 P. 2d 1147 (1953).
47 Lindsey v. United States, C. A. 9 Alaska, 237 F. 2d 893 (1956).
48 Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A. 2d 401 (1951).
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the third party-and hence the recording-was an eavesdropper
and thus subject to the rules of evidence governing witnesses. 4 9
However, in People v. Buckowski,5 0 in which a wife and
husband were being tried for murder, the court admitted re-
cordings of statements made by the wife, not to prove the truth
of what she had said as to the husband, but for the purpose of
showing his conduct in the face of an accusatory statement.
Once the recordings are admitted in evidence, their use en-
counters still further problems, such as the admission of type-
written or printed transcripts of the recordings, the weighing of
evidence as presented by mechanical or human witnesses, the in-
clusion of irrelevant or prejudicial matter, use of recordings to
impeach witnesses, as well as the consideration of sound record-
ings under the rules applying to cross-examination, hearsay, and
corroboration.
Typewritten or printed transcripts of the recordings prepared
for distribution to the court, counsel, and each juror can meet
the requirements of the best evidence rule by having the stenog-
rapher testify to the transcription's accuracy, and by having the
original recordings introduced in evidence at the same time.51
When typewritten transcripts are placed in evidence in place
of recordings, a proper foundation must be laid for their admis-
sion, connecting the various steps required to trace the transcript
all the way back to the source of the recording.52
When a transcript was used in place of a recording in the
preparation of a stenographer's transcript of the trial court pro-
ceedings, the court reporter was permitted to replay the phono-
graph recordings heard by the jury, even though the discs them-
selves had not been introduced. The court held that the conver-
sations on the discs were in evidence, and that the situation was
comparable to the introduction in evidence of a voluminous re-
port which the court reporter was allowed to copy later into his
record for the reviewing court.53
Written transcriptions of sound recordings often are used to
refresh the memory of a witness who participated in or overheard
the conversation. However, the accuracy of the transcript must
49 Erlich v. Erlich, 278 App. Div. 244, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 531 (1951).
50 37 Cal. 2d 629, 253 P. 2d 912 (1951).
51 People v. Feld, supra note 34.
52 Applebaum v. Applebaum, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 505; State v. Raasch, supra
note 33.
53 Jones v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 519, 209 S. W. 2d 613 (1948).
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be established, and it must have been made under the witness'
direction,5 4 or reviewed, corrected, and approved by him soon
enough after the written transcript was made so that the con-
versation was still fresh in his memory.55
Although the courts are basically in agreement as to the re-
quirements for the admissibility of sound recordings in evidence,
they are somewhat at odds as to deciding whether to accept the
testimony of a mechanical witness as opposed to that of a human
witness reporting on the same matter before the court.
In some cases, the testimony of the human witness has been
accepted as primary evidence, notwithstanding the fact that the
same evidence was on a sound recording, or was reduced to
writing.50 Where the conversation of two prisoners was over-
heard by a police officer in an adjoining cell at the same time
that the conversation was being recorded, the court ruled in
favor of the police officer's oral testimony, saying, ". . . surely
even the tape recording could not be regarded as any more ef-
ficacious than the testimony of the officer from memory as to
what he actually heard." 5T
However, even though the oral testimony of the human wit-
ness was accepted as best evidence, sound recordings are not
ruled inadmissible. 58 In United States v. Lewis,5 9 the court drew
no distinction between the two, but it did regard the sound re-
cording as being able to present the more trustworthy evidence.
Still another court looked upon the sound recorded evidence as
being more apt to be accurate and complete than the witness'
recollection.60
When it comes to a question of the presence of irrelevant,
objectionable, or prejudicial matter in the sound recording, it is
advisable to have the recording played before the court and
counsel in the absence of the jury, so that incompetent portions
of the recording may be skipped or deleted before permitting the
54 McGuire v. State, 200 Md. 601, 92 A. 2d 582 (1952).
55 People v. Sica, 112 Cal. App. 2d 574, 247 P. 2d 72 (1952); People v. Vera,
131 Cal. App. 2d 669, 281 P. 2d 65 (1955); People v. Goldberg, 152 Cal. App.
2d 562, 314 P. 2d 151 (1957).
56 People v. Kulwin, 102 Cal. App. 2d 104, 226 P. 2d 672 (1951).
57 Thompson v. State, 298 P. 2d 464 (Okla. Crim. 1956).
58 Monroe v. United States, supra note 23; Schwartz v. State, 158 Tex.
Crim. 171, 246 S. W. 2d 174 (1951).
59 87 F. Supp. 970 (D. C. Dist. Col. 1950).
60 United States v. Klosterman, 147 F. Supp. 843 (D. C. Pa. 1957).
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jury to hear the sound recordings.6 1 But if the prejudicial matter
cannot be edited out, the recording may be excluded, as in the
case involving two defendants, one charged with rape and the
other with attempted rape, whose recorded statements were not
admitted because the court felt the jury would be unable to dis-
tinguish which portions of the recordings would be admissible as
to one defendant and not the other.62
If the objectionable matter does not result in prejudice, the
court may find this to be harmless error.63 Similarly, the court
will not exclude a recording because it contains vulgar and ob-
scene language.64
The prosecuting attorney who makes sound recordings of
defendants' statements must be careful not to phrase his ques-
tions or statements in such a manner that they may be con-
strued as an expression of his belief in a defendant's guilt, since
this would constitute prejudicial matter and quite probably
would result in the court ruling the sound recordings inadmis-
sible.165
Sound recordings or typewritten transcripts of recordings
generally have been admitted by the courts for the purpose of
impeaching a witness by contradicting his trial testimony.66 How-
ever, the successful impeachment of a witness may depend upon
first laying the foundation for such tactics during cross-examina-
tion.67
Conversely, where a witness' veracity has been attacked
under severe cross-examination, a sound recording of his original
statements may be admitted into evidence to refute the inference
which may have been implanted in the minds of the jurors.6 8
Sound recordings are sometimes attacked as hearsay evi-
dence, apparently without much success if the proper founda-
61 Leeth v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 61, 230 P. 2d 942 (1951).
62 People v. Dorsey, 144 Cal. App. 2d 258, 300 P. 2d 885 (1956).
63 Paulson v. Scott, 260 Wis. 141, 50 N. W. 2d 376; People v. Curtis, 134 Cal.
App. 2d 624, 286 P. 2d 446 (1955).
64 State v. Slater, 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P. 2d 329; People v. Feld, supra note
34; People v. Fratianno, 132 Cal. App. 2d 610, 282 P. 2d 1002 (1955).
65 People v. Dorsey, supra note 62; Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500,
113 A. 2d 464 (1955).
66 Baron v. Kings-Suffolk Realty Corp., 4 Misc. 2d 587; 158 N. Y. S. 2d 923
(1957); Applebaum v. Applebaum, supra note 52; Calumet Broadcasting
Corp. v. Federal Communications Com., 82 App. D. C. 59, 160 F. 2d 285
(1947).
67 State v. Simon, 113 N. J. L. 521, 174 A. 867 (1934).
68 People v. Feld, supra note 34.
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tion has been laid for their admissibility, and if the contents of
the records are subject to counteracting rules of evidence. For
example, when a sound recording was offered in evidence to
impeach a witness, the court overruled the objection on the
grounds of hearsay because the recording was offered to prove
only that the witness contradicted himself, not to prove the facts
in the recording. 9
Also, by having the defendant say that he told the truth at
the time the sound recording was made, the prosecution suc-
cessfully set the stage for its inclusion in evidence over an ob-
jection that the recordings constituted hearsay, conclusions, or
replies to leading questions.70
In an action to contest a will, the trial court rejected as hear-
say evidence a sound recording containing the true identity of a
named beneficiary. This was held to be reversible error by the
appellate court since the recording was admitted to show only
that the secretary had erred in placing the wrong name in the
written transcript of the will, and that other evidence was avail-
able to prove whether the testator intended the appellant or the
appellee as beneficiary. 7
The sound recording even has its place in the jury room, ac-
cording to the judge in State v. Reyes,7 2 answering the objection
that use of a record player by the jury to hear discs offered in
evidence would have the effect of giving undue weight to the
evidence:
The disc, being an exhibit in the case, necessarily went
to the jury . . . but without a machine on which the re-
cording could be played back it would serve no purpose.
The objection that the evidence would be unduly emphasized
could be made as well to a written and signed confession,
which, when it is received in evidence, goes to the jury and
can be read and reread as many times as the jurors desire.
After a somewhat slow start, sound recordings have made
increasingly frequent appearances before the courts, and the
trend toward more compact and easily-operated equipment is in
itself sufficient indication of the future of sound recordings used
as evidence in court.
69 State v. Porter, 125 Mont. 503, 242 P. 2d 984 (1952).
70 People v. Dorsey, supra note 62.
71 Hultquist v. Ring, 301 S. W. 2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
72 209 Or. 607, 308 P. 2d 196 (1957).
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